Cognitive penetration and nonconceptual content


Abstract

This paper seeks to establish whether the cognitive penetration of experience is compatible with experience having nonconceptual content. Cognitive penetration occurs when one's beliefs or desires affect one's perceptual experience in a particular way. I examine two different models of cognitive penetration and four different accounts of the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content. I argue that one model of cognitive penetration—"classic" cognitive penetration—is compatible with only one of the accounts of nonconceptual content that I identify. I then consider the other model of cognitive penetration—cognitive penetration "lite"—and provide reasons to think that this is compatible with three accounts of nonconceptual content. Moreover, I argue that the account of nonconceptual content that it is compatible with is a spurious notion of nonconceptual content that ought to be abandoned. Thus, I claim that cognitive penetration lite is compatible with all reasonable specifications of nonconceptual content.
Conceptual and nonconceptual content. Varieties of nonconceptual content. Problems with nonconceptual content. Bibliography. The main examples of these putative mental states with nonconceptual contents are conscious perceptual experiences and the nonconscious states of cognitive information-processing systems (such as the visual system). I propose a solution to this problem that turns on the concept of nonconceptual content, and I relate the solution to Stephen Kosslyn's (1994) architecture of perception and visual mental imagery. Viewed in a broader context, the solution shows that the world leaks into the mind, as well as mind leaking into the world. Authors: Terry Dartnall. Related Documents: 2208917 - Is cognitive functioning impaired in methamphetamine users? a critical review. 24912617 - Polymer ferroelectric field-effect memory device with sno channel layer exhibits record 3268257 - Memorability functions as a...